Effects of Leadership Strategies on Corruption Eradication in Kajiado County

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Abstract: **Corruption has been identified as a major barrier to economic and social development in developing countries, and considerable research as been done into the causes of and the solutions to corruption in these countries.In this regard, this study sought to investigate effects of leadership strategies on corruption eradication focusing on Kajiado County. Specifically, this study sought: to identify the effects of corruption in leadership in public offices in Kajiado County; to establish identify the causes of corruption in leadership in public offices in Kajiado County; to identify establish the extent types of corruption in leadership in public offices in Kajiado County; to identify determine the ways in of eradicating which corruption in leadership in public offices in Kajiado County can be eradicated. The research design used in the study was the survey design. The target population for the study where the MCAs from the 56 County Assemblies in Kajiado County. A sample size of 30 MCAS where used for the study. This study used questionnaires as the primary data collection tool and the Data collected will be collated, coded, summarized and then analyzed using the Statistical package for Social Science (SPSS). From the findings, it is clear that MCAs in Kajiado County are not satisfied with their current salary. These public servants perceive that they do not get a fair remuneration as per their expectations which may hinder the fight against corruption in the County and the country at large. However, remuneration has a moderate effect on corruption and increasing salaries of public sector workers may not necessarily reduce corruption. Regarding personal relationships and corruption, it can be concluded that business ties are the most influential relationships that enable corruption in public sector. Others with a lesser but significant effect are social ties and relationships between public officials. Personal relationships have a moderate effect on corruption eradication. When ongoing personal interactions between government officials and entrepreneurs are extensive, the opportunities for engaging in corruption might increase.**

Keywords: **Effects, Leadership, Corruption.**

1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Corruption is the practice whereby some public money is illicitly diverted for private gain. This practice is present to some degree in all societies. Corruption has been identified as a major barrier to economic and social development in developing countries, and considerable research as been done into the causes of and the solutions to corruption in these countries. The wide spread of corruption in developing countries has raised substantial concern. Developing countries, particular circumstances rapid economic and social change, strong kinship and ethnic ties, new institutions, overlapping and sometimes conflicting views about what is proper public behavior appear to contribute to corruption's saliency (Gould &Amara-Reyes, 1983).

Corruption in Kenya has had a history which spurs the era of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi KANU government to Mwai's Kibaki PNU government. In the corruption perception index 2012, Kenya is ranked 139 out of 176 countries for corruption tied with Azerbaijan, Nepal, Nigeria, and Pakistan (least corrupt countries are at the top). It is estimated the average urban Kenyan pays 16 bribes per month. Most of these bribes are fairly small but large ones are also taken.

Corruption scandals in Kenya have taken many forms, between 1986 and 1991, the construction of the Turkwel (Hydroelectric power station} was riddled with claims of corruption. The dam was eventually built at three times the estimated cost, yet producing energy significantly below capacity.

Between 1990-1999, the largest running scandal was the Goldenberg scandal, where the Kenyan government subsidized exports of gold, paying exporters in cash 35% over the foreign currency earnings. In this case gold was smuggled in Congo. The Goldenberg scandal cost Kenya the equivalent of more than 10% of the country's annual G.D.P. In 2003, military was split over plans to buy new (Czech fighter jets) the plan to buy jet fighters would have cost the tax payers cash 12.3 billion.So corruption has been a major ailment in leadership in public offices in Kenya.

Statement of the Problem:

Thus, despite the positive changes, there is a widespread perception that corruption permeates all sectors of public life in Kenya, as reflected by major governance indicators. There has been a slight improvement over the past decade according to both Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank's Governance Indicators, but still Kenya scores relatively poorly on both these measurements. In 2011, the country was ranked 154 out of the 182 countries assessed by Transparency International (TI). Kenya also scores poorly (21 out of 100) in terms of freedom of corruption in the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, with pervasive corruption leading to foreign disinvestment and draining resources from education, health and infrastructure. In this regard, this study seeks to investigate the effects of leadership strategies on corruption eradication in Kajiado County.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Social Theories

The level of social trust in a particular context is an external factor that has not received as much attention but has been observed to have economic and political impact. Its causal relationship to corruption has been expressed by linking economic inequality with low social trust (Uslaner 2005): Rather than being caused by "bad leaders and weak institutions" corruption is said to be caused by a "society's culture and the distribution of resources" (Uslaner 2005:7). The model has been used to help understand why corruption is lower in contexts with high generalised or social trust and higher in contexts with low social trust (Rothstein 2011: 146).

Trust has also been identified as necessary to maintain corrupt networks. Particularised (or "in-group") trust of the network members is necessary for maintaining corrupt networks such as organised crime groups(Uslaner 2005). In a study of a corrupt police network in the Australian state of Queensland using social network theory, the network was demonstrated to be most vulnerable when the particularized trust between members broke down and members shifted their focus from protecting the network to protecting themselves (Warburton 2007).

The idea that a corrupt act can occur when a perpetrator has a motivation and an opportunity to act corruptly and considers the likelihood of detection or punishment is low was the basis for the national anti-corruption strategy in Singapore to "minimize or remove the conditions of both incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt conduct irresistible". In that context, the elements were identified as: an incentive of low public service salaries combined with opportunities created by inefficient public sector systems and a low risk of detection and punishment (Quah 2007: 42-45).

Public Choice Theory:

This theory was made popular by Rose-Ackerman (1978), who claimed that public officials are corrupt for a simple reason: they perceive that the potential benefits of corruption exceed the potential costs. Or as Klitgaard (1988: 70) stated, "if the benefits of corruption minus the probability of being caught times its penalties are greater than the benefits of not being caught, then an individual will rationally choose to be corrupt." The theory can be expanded when conditions that influence the cost-benefit calculations are taken into account. For example, trust can play an important role. When the state cannot be trusted to manage private property transfers, corruption might become more appealing (Gambetta 1993).

Also, trust within close personal relationships increases the chance of getting the benefits from the delivered corrupt 'services' or reduces the chance of getting caught. In this kind of theory, actions of corrupt officials are caused by a

rational, conscious and deliberate weighing process of an individual. In its purest form, autonomous agents are assumed to make more or less rational means-end calculations.

The causal chain is that of an individual making a (bounded) rational decision that leads to a predetermined outcome. The centre of the public choice theory is the individual corrupt official who tries to maximize his or her utility. The individual is portrayed as a rationally calculating person who decides to become corrupt when its expected advantages outweigh its expected disadvantages (a combination of possible penalty and the chance of being caught).

Organizational Culture Theories:

The underlying assumption in these theories is that a causal path from a certain culture – the culture of a certain group – leads to a certain mental state which in turn leads to corrupt behavior. Failure in the "proper machinery" of government, not faulty character, leads public officials to act corruptly. As such, it accounts for the context in which corrupt acts occur in. Punch (2000), when talking about corruption within police departments around the world, argued that if these activities can be scanned, then it is plain that it would no longer be about dealing with individuals seeking solely personal gain, but with group behavior rooted in established arrangements and/or extreme practices that have to be located within the structures and culture of police work and the police organization. Punch (2000) concluded that in tackling corruption and other forms of police deviance, it is vital to focus on group dynamics, the escalation from minor to serious deviance, and on the negative elements in the police culture.

These types of theories are not so much interested in the corrupt official, but in the contextual features that make for the setting of corruption. In that sense, these theories are not really about the causes of corruption. Implicit in most of these theories is the contention that people in organizations act on the particular dynamics of the organization. This brings forward a related group of theories of corruption that should be grouped here; those that see corruption as 'contagious' (e.g. Klitgaard 1988; Caiden and Dwivedi 2001; Hulten 2002). These theories state that once an organizational culture (or country) is corrupt, every person who comes in contact with it also runs a big risk of becoming corrupt. Therefore (and interestingly enough) corruption itself seems to be the 'cause' of corruption (even though the specific causal relationship is hard to define). These theories sometimes use the metaphor of the 'slippery slope' (Punch 2000). Failing to be corrupt in certain organizational cultures means betraying the group (Punch, 2000). These theories lead to a discourse on corruption control in which the emphasis is on influencing the culture of an organization, the so-called 'cultural instruments' by, for example, altering the organization's leadership (Trevino, Hartman and Brown, 2000; Huberts, Kaptein and Lasthuizen, 2004).

Research Gaps:

While there have been positive changes in the fight against corruption in Kenya, there is a widespread perception that corruption permeates all sectors of public life in the country, as reflected by major governance indicators - Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank's Governance Indicators. Kenya scores relatively poorly on both these measurements. Nevertheless, little research has been done on how to eradicate corruption. This study therefore has the quest to investigate corruption in leadership in public offices taking the case study of Kajiado County.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Design:

The research design to be used in the study was the survey design; inferential statistics were used to determine how likely it is for the results obtained from the sample to be similar to results expected from the entire population. Descriptive and qualitative methods were used. Qualitative research provides an in-depth perspective and attempts to provide a context in which the results where to be understood and to analyze the links that exist. Quantitative data uses numerals (statistics) to analyze data.

4. RESEARCH FINDING AND DISCUSSION

Introduction:

This chapter presents data analysis, findings, interpretation and presentation. Data was analyzed using descriptive tools where frequencies, percentages as well as the mean were used to interpret the findings. The purpose of this study was to

investigate effects of leadership strategies on corruption eradication in Kajiado County. The target respondents were the members of county assembly (MCAs) in Kajiado County.

Response Rate

Questionnaires	Percent
Administered	30
Returned	30
Response Rate	**100%**

A total of 30 questionnaires were administered to the MCAs for them to complete whereby all of them completed and returned the questionnaires. Hence, the response rate was 100% as illustrated in the table above.

General Information:

Gender Analysis

Questionnaires	No. of respondents	Percent
Female	10	33.3
Male	20	66.7
Response Rate	**30**	**100%**

Table 4.2 shows that 20 male respondents (66.7%) compared to 10 female respondents (33.3%) took part in the study. This clearly shows that most of the respondents who took part in the study were male.

Effects of Remuneration on Corruption Eradication:

Satisfaction with the Current Remuneration

Satisfaction with current salary	Frequency	Percent
Very satisfied	4	13.3
Satisfied	9	30.0
Dissatisfied	11	36.7
Very Dissatisfied	6	20.0
Total	**30**	**100**

Findings indicated that most (56.7%) of the MCAs are not satisfied with their current salary. Even so, 43.3% mentioned that they were satisfied. This indicates that the MCAs do not get a fair remuneration as per their expectations which may hinder the fight against corruption in the County. These findings concur with findings by Tanzi, (1998) on the common intuition that higher salaries for officials induce a lower level of corruption. This relationship was further statistically supported in a study by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).

Remuneration and Corruption

Aspect	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Mean
Low remuneration increases corruption in public sector	33.3	23.3	30.0	13.3	2.8
Private sector workers are better paid than Public Servants	23.3	36.7	16.7	23.3	2.6
The low salaries in the public sector attracts incompetent persons	13.3	20.0	40.0	26.7	2.2
Increasing salaries of public sector workers can reduce corruption	10.0	23.3	36.7	30.0	2.1
Index					**2.4**

A 4-likert scale was used to investigate the effect of remuneration on corruption eradication where the MCAs were required to rate their agreement with statements on the issue. According to the findings, the index stood at a mean of 2.4 which indicates that remuneration has a moderate effect on corruption. Most (56.6%) of the MCAs agreed that low remuneration increases corruption in the public sector recording the highest mean at 2.8. Nonetheless, MCAs were pessimistic that increasing salaries of public sector workers can reduce corruption as indicated by the lowest mean of 2.1 where most (66.7%) of them disagreed. According to Rose-Ackerman (1975), when government positions are paid worse than comparable other jobs, the moral costs of corruption are reduced. Poorly paid public officials might find it less reprehensible to accept bribes than officials receiving a comparatively fair salary.

Effects of Personal Relationship on Corruption Eradication:

Most Influential Relationships in Enabling Corruption

The study revealed that business ties are the most influential relationships that enable corruption in public sector as asserted by majority (70%) of the MCAs. This was followed by social ties at 60% while relationship between public officials was the least at 46.7%. While identifying business ties as one of the relationships that contribute to corruption, Peng and Luo (2000) noted that business ties include relationships with agents of other firms, that is, suppliers, buyers or competitors.

Personal Relationships and Corruption Eradication

Effect of Personal Relationships on Corruption Eradication	Very Large Extent	Large Extent	Moderate Extent	Little Extent	Very Little Extent	Mean
Business Relationships between Government officials and Suppliers	23.3	30.0	16.7	20.0	10.0	3.4
Family Relationships between Government Officials and Other Workers in their Office	16.7	23.3	33.3	16.7	10.0	3.2
Friendship Relationships between Government Officials and Other Workers/Suppliers	13.3	30.0	20.0	23.3	13.3	3.1
Index						**3.2**

According to the findings, personal relationships have a moderate effect on corruption eradication as indicated by the index of 3.2 which was computed on 5-scale likert. Business relationships between government officials and suppliers were alleged to have the greatest effect as indicated by the highest mean of 3.2. On the other hand, friendship relationships between government officials and other workers/suppliers have the least effect as indicated by the lowest mean of 3.1. When ongoing personal interactions between government officials and entrepreneurs are extensive, the opportunities for engaging in corruption increases (Collins et al., 2009). It is in line with this that Kaufmann and Wei, (1999) noted that the frequency of interactions and the amount of time entrepreneurs spend with the government official are expected to positively correlate to acts of bribery.

5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Summary of the Findings:

Effects of Remuneration on Corruption Eradication:

Most (56.7%) of the MCAs in Kajiado County are not satisfied with their current salary. Even so, 43.3% mentioned that they were satisfied. This indicates that the MCAs do not get a fair remuneration as per their expectations. When a 4-likert scale was used to investigate the effect of remuneration on corruption eradication, the index stood at a mean of 2.4 which indicates that remuneration has a moderate effect on corruption. Most (56.6%) of the MCAs agreed that low remuneration increases corruption in the public sector recording the highest mean at 2.8.

Effects of Personal Relationship on Corruption Eradication:

Business ties were found to be the most influential relationships that enable corruption in public sector as asserted by majority (70%) of the MCAs. The findings indicated that personal relationships have a moderate effect on corruption eradication as its index was recorded at 3.2 computed on 5-scale likert. Business relationships between government officials and suppliers were alleged to have the greatest effect where they recorded the highest mean of 3.2.

Conclusion:

From the findings, it is clear that MCAs in Kajiado County are not satisfied with their current salary. These public servants perceive that they do not get a fair remuneration as per their expectations which may hinder the fight against corruption in the County and the country at large. However, remuneration has a moderate effect on corruption and increasing salaries of public sector workers may not necessarily reduce corruption.

Regarding personal relationships and corruption, it can be concluded that business ties are the most influential relationships that enable corruption in public sector. Others with a lesser but significant effect are social ties and relationships between public officials. Personal relationships have a moderate effect on corruption eradication. When ongoing personal interactions between government officials and entrepreneurs are extensive, the opportunities for engaging in corruption might increase.

Recommendation for Further Studies:

This study is recommended for further study on how to assist more the Kajiado County in eradicating the corruption.

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